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Geraldine Coggins’s book is the first book on the issue of metaphysical 
nihilism. It is an interesting and challenging opinionated introduction to 
this topic. Sometimes the very existence of the world we are in appears 
mysterious to us. And it is not uncommon to wonder why there is some-
thing rather than nothing in such circumstances. But the question “why 
is there something rather than nothing?” does make sense only if it is as-
sumed that there could have been nothing. Metaphysical nihilism is the 
view that there could have been nothing, and this is the view Coggins is 
challenging in this book.
Coggins’s book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is an intro-
duction in which Coggins displays her methodology and clarifies the de-
bate between metaphysical nihilism and its anti-nihilist opponents. There 
Coggins undermines necessitarianism, the view that things could not have 
been different, and she understands metaphysical nihilism as the view that 
there could have been nothing concrete, while anti-nihilism turns out to 
be the view that there has to be something concrete. Chapter 2 introduces 
the reader to the main argument in favour of metaphysical nihilism, the 
so-called subtraction argument. The original subtraction argument for ni-
hilism relies on the following premises:
(A1) There might be a world with a finite domain of concrete objects.
(A2) These concrete objects are, each of them, things which might not exist.
(A3) The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the 
existence of any other such thing. (11)
(A1) appeals to the notion of a possible world. So in chapter 3 Coggins ar-
gues that metaphysical nihilism is incompatible with any view of possible 
worlds according to which worlds are composed of objects (the so-called 
compositionalist view) and is committed to either ersatzism about worlds 
or a substantivalism about space-time. Premise (A1) also appeals to the 
notion of a concrete object, which is the topic of chapter 4. In this chap-
ter Coggins conceives of concrete objects as things that are in time, that 
are temporally located, and she dismisses alternative accounts of concrete 
objects. Helped with this elucidation of the concepts involved in the sub-
traction argument, Coggins, in chapter 5, carefully examines the premises 
of the subtraction argument and objects to (A3) on the basis of Jonathan 
Lowe’s (2002) argument against metaphysical nihilism. Roughly, Lowe’s 
objection consists in maintaining that abstract objects are necessary and 
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that they depend for their existence on concrete objects. If Lowe is right, 
then there has to be something. In chapter 6, Coggins elaborates on this 
objection arguing that the subtraction argument cannot succeed in estab-
lishing metaphysical nihilism because “by focusing only on the properties 
of concrete objects, the proponents of the subtraction argument … have 
overlooked the possibility that something about another kind of object 
could make it necessary that concrete objects exist” (135). Moreover, 
Coggins argues that the subtraction strategy is unconvincing because it 
is akin to a downward induction reasoning that generalises from a large 
collection of uncontroversial cases to controversial cases. Chapter 7 sum-
marises the whole argument of the book.
As the structure of the book makes clear there are three main ar-
guments in Coggins’s book. The first argument, which is the topic of 
chapter 3, is that metaphysical nihilism, given the subtraction argument, 
incurs a commitment to some controversial view about possible worlds. 
The second argument is that proponents of subtraction arguments have 
overlooked the possibility that some truth about another kind of entities 
makes it necessary that there are concrete objects. And the third argu-
ment is that the subtraction strategy requires an unconvincing downward 
induction reasoning. The reader should notice that these arguments do not 
aim to establish that nihilism is false but only that metaphysical nihilism 
is controversial and that the main argument for metaphysical nihilism is 
flawed. For showing that one view is affirmed in the absence of good 
and uncontroversial grounds does not justify the claim that the opposite 
view is better motivated or less controversial. So given these arguments 
it would be wrong to interpret the book’s subtitle, “Against Metaphysi-
cal Nihilism”, as meaning that the book argues for anti-nihilism. Indeed, 
Coggins does not appear to be fully convinced by the few positive argu-
ments in favour of anti-nihilism that she discusses in the book (92–115 
and 140).
But let us consider Coggins’s objections to metaphysical nihilism in 
more detail. First, Coggins argues that metaphysical nihilism is usually 
taken to be “a common sense view, agnostic between accounts of what 
possible worlds are” (54), whereas metaphysical nihilism is not neutral 
regarding the account of possible worlds. Coggins’s affirmation seems 
puzzling to me. Why should a common sense view be agnostic between 
accounts of possible worlds? After all, modalism, which is a scepticism 
about possible worlds in general, is a common sense view about modality 
(Melia 2003). But the modalist is not agnostic between accounts of pos-
sible worlds: it denies them all! Moreover, metaphysical nihilists since 
Baldwin (1996: 231) have always been explicit about the fact that some 
compositionalist accounts of possible worlds, in particular Genuine Mo-
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dal Realism and Combinatorialism, were taken by their proponents to be 
incompatible with metaphysical nihilism. It is true that some metaphysi-
cal nihilists have attempted to show the compatibility of these versions 
of compositionalism with metaphysical nihilism despite their apparent 
incompatibility (see in particular Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004 and Efird and 
Stoneham 2006). But these authors are aware of the fact that in order to 
make these views compatible some emendations of Genuine Modal Real-
ism and Combinatorialism are required. Coggins rejects these attempts to 
show the compatibility of compositionalism and nihilism on the grounds 
that they either are committed to a null-individual she finds problematic 
(27–38) or define possible worlds in terms of ontological categories that, 
according to her, do not cut reality at the joints (47–51). But whatever we 
think of her arguments against these views, they do not justify the fact that 
Coggins often writes as if metaphysical nihilists were not aware of the fact 
that their view is not agnostic about the analysis of modality.
Coggins is certainly right that being agnostic about the nature of pos-
sible worlds would be dialectically advantageous for metaphysical nihil-
ists. For then they could expect to convince readers whatever their view 
about possible worlds. But what is wrong with the fact that one’s modal 
intuitions yield the rejection of some view of possible worlds? The role 
of an analysis of modality is to account for our modal intuitions. If some 
possible world analysis of modality fails to account for one’s modal intui-
tions, then this is a good reason to reject this analysis of modality rather 
than a good reason to deny our modal intuitions. Coggins seems to think 
otherwise (123–125), but I am not convinced.1
To conclude on possible worlds, I should say that I have been aston-
ished to find that the possibility that metaphysical nihilism is not com-
mitted to any view of possible worlds is not considered anywhere in the 
book. It is true that the subtraction argument, in particular premise (A1), 
has been formulated using possible worlds discourse. It is also true that 
proponents of metaphysical nihilism often defend their view using possi-
ble worlds discourse. But the thesis of metaphysical nihilism – that there 
could have been nothing concrete – does not involve reference to possi-
ble worlds. If you think that no account of our everyday modal idioms is 
satisfactory unless it appeals to possible worlds discourse, then you will 
maintain that we need possible worlds in order to make sense of meta-
physical nihilism. But some philosophers, the modalists, have denied that 
we need possible worlds in order to analyse our everyday modal idioms. 
And it seems plausible to me that, with the help of adequate technical de-
1 Coggins also denies that metaphysical nihilism is based on intuitions (132–135). I 
found this argument unclear.
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vices,2 a modalist version of the subtraction argument can be proposed that 
does not quantify over possible worlds. If so and if modalism is indeed a 
common sense view on modality, then, contrary to Coggins’s (54–6) claim 
to the opposite, metaphysical nihilism is compatible with a common sense 
view of modality that is also ontologically parsimonious (since it does not 
commit us to any ontology of worlds). So the compatibility of nihilism 
with modalism is an open research project that should be explored and it 
is regrettable that it is not explored in this book.
Coggins’s third objection to metaphysical nihilism is closely linked 
to her first objection. Her third objection is that the subtraction argument 
is unconvincing because it requires a downward induction reasoning that 
generalises from uncontroversial uses of subtraction to controversial ones 
(125–132). The controversial cases, according to Coggins, are uses of sub-
traction in worlds which contain exactly one concrete object, so-called 
singleton worlds. But why are these uses of subtraction controversial? Be-
cause worlds where there is only one concrete object are “ontologically 
different from other worlds in a way that is relevant to the ontology of the 
subtraction procedure, namely the very nature of possibility or of what a 
possible world is” (131). Of course, it seems undeniable that whether the 
subtraction procedure can be applied in the case of the singleton worlds 
is relevant to our conception (if not “ontology”) of subtraction and to the 
ontology of possible worlds. But why should this entail that the single-
ton worlds are “ontologically different”? Whether we can subtract from 
the singleton world may yield some controversial choice regarding the 
nature of all worlds. So, in this way, singleton worlds are different from 
many-concreta worlds in that they teach us something more about the na-
ture of worlds and the concept of subtraction. However, this difference is 
fairly extrinsic and unnatural and does not warrant the claim that singleton 
worlds are ontologically different in a way that would justify the claim 
that possible worlds, whatever they are, are all of a same ontological kind. 
And if so it is not clear to me why applying the subtraction procedure to 
the singleton world should be any more controversial than applying it to 
any other world.
Coggins’s second objection is that metaphysical nihilists have over-
looked the possibility that some truths about another kind of entities (ab-
stract objects or worlds) makes it necessary that there are concrete objects 
(pp. 119–123). This argument relies on Lowe’s argument that abstract ob-
jects are both necessary and dependent on concrete objects and on Cog-
2 It is plausible that in order to formulate an adequate version of the subtraction 
premise (A3) in modalist discourse, we would need to appeal to Vlach or indexed modal 
operators; Forbes (1989). 
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gins’s argument that some accounts of possible worlds make it necessary 
that there are objects. However, metaphysical nihilists have been busy 
arguing that there are plausible accounts of possible worlds that do not 
make the existence of concrete objects necessary (see above) and they 
have offered a plausible reply to Lowe’s argument (see in particular Rod-
riguez-Pereyra 2002). So Coggins’s second objection seems unfair to me. 
Of course, Coggins is not convinced by accounts of possible worlds that 
are compatible with nihilism (see chapter 3) nor is she convinced by re-
plies to Lowe’s objection (101–111). And perhaps she is right not to be 
convinced by the latter. But that is not a reason to accuse the nihilists of 
having been careless.
Despite these criticisms I recommend Coggins’s book as an excellent 
introduction to this fundamental topic of traditional metaphysics.3
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